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I. The Recent Debate on Rules for Monetary Policy
F
or a long time, there has been a controversy on whether monetary
policy shouldfollow rules orreact in a discretionary manner. Inrecent
years, the discussion has become more controversial for several rea-
sons. Some argue that, after monetarypolicy has fulfilled the taskofreducing
the high inflation rates which hadbuiltup in the seventies, the most pressing
problem is now unemployment, particularly in Western Europe. But there is
,not only this shift in priorities. Many would go even further and say that
monetary targeting has altogether failed, and that this has become most
obvious in the eighties. These critics, too, point at the stubbornlyhigh unem-
ployment - reflecting supposedly the cost of reducing inflation -, but in
particularat the large changes invelocity in the United States andsome other
countries.ThedeclineinvelocityintheUnitedStatesimpliedthatinflationwas
cutdrasticallyinspiteofrelativelystrongmoneygrowth.1Radmonetarypolicy
followed a fixed rule - of, say, keeping monetary expansion at six percentper
year-,theUnitedStateswouldhaveexperienceda recessionmuchmoresevere
thantheactualonein 1980/82.Therefore,theargumentgoes,theUS-Fedwas
right in overshooting pre-announced targets and in following a more prag-
matic strategy.2
More recently it was pointed out, in particular by Meltzer [1987] and
McCallum [1987], that the alternatives are not fixed rules and discretionary
policies. In their view, monetary policy can be adjusted to contingencies Iike
"financial turmoiIs" which occurredin the United States during the period of
financial deregulation and innovations in the earIy eighties and which had
1The rapid expansion of monetary aggregates starting in the summer of 1982 Ied many
observers to forecast a resurgence ofinflation at that time.
2 Blinder[1987] criticizestheconceptofmIes becauseitsupposedIyimpliesfIXing a mdderina
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probablycontributedtothefall invelocity.3Thisreactioncanbe"activist",but
the important element in a rule-like monetary policy is precommitment: the
monetary authority should make clear that it would compensate such shifts
accordingtoapre-announcedpolicy. Inthis waytheeconomycanabsorbsuch
shocks without additional disturbances and can stay on a fairly stable path
withthepricelevel thecentralbankhascommitteditselfto. Thisflexible ruleis
compatible with the rational-expectations view on economic policy: it would
not make much ofa difference with respect to the evolution ofthe economy
what a rule looks like as long as it is known to economic agents (postulate of
neutrality or policy ineffectiveness). If the precommitment aims at a stable
pricelevel, sucha rulewould- as was arguedbyKydland/Prescott[1977] and
BarrolGordon [1983] - be superior to discretionary policies in the long run.
Thecentralbankwouldnotbetemptedtocreatepricesurpriseswhichincrease
employment in the short run4 butlead to inflation in the medium run without
changing employment.
McCallum [1987] introduces a concrete example of a rule for monetary
policy: thegrowthofthemonetarybaseshoulddependonthetrendgrowthof
real GNP, the medium-run velocity growth and the deviations of nominal-
GNPgrowth from a target value; this reference path is given bythe long-run
development ofreal output. While the reaction to velocity changes is justified
bythe"financialturmoil"-argument,theuse ofthenominal-GNPtargetneeds
explaining: McCallum states that since we do not know how a monetary
impulse splits up into outputandprice effects ona period-by-period basis, the
best way to assure price level stability in the medium run is to keep nominal
GNP close to the trend path of real GNP. He tests the performance of this
feedback-rule by applying it to the underlying model of the economy. The
result ofthe simulationis thatthe price level is stable in the medium run, and
thatthefluctuations ofnominalGNParemuchsmallerthanactuallyobserved.
11. An Application to the Case ofWest Germany
Inspiteofthewidespreadpracticeofcentralbankstoannouncetargetsfor
moneygrowth,itmaybesaidthatmonetarypolicyhas notactuallyfollowed a
3 Friedman[1988] analyzes the behavior ofvelocity in the United States andconcludes that
the relationships betweenincomeandvariousmonetaryaggregates collapsedinthe 1980s. Burger
[1988] investigates the relationships between monetary policy actions and several monetary
aggregates. Hefinds thatportfolio shifts - also due to financial innovations - affected the various
measures in disparate ways.
4 This type ofanalysis is based on a specific utility function which implies a gain from more
employment. However, ifwe accept that any deviation from the full-information equilibrium is
suboptimal (people work more than they would ifthey had better information, which means that
theyare"fooled"),we would notconsidersucha utilityfunction. Nevertheless,itseems toapplyto
real-world considerations, i.e., policymakers seem to behave as ifsuch short-run benefits exist.328 Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv
well-defined rule. Instead, we could observe substantial over- and sometimes
undershootingofthe monetarytargets; there were obvious shifts inpriorities,
and we continued to have inflation and sizable cyclical fluctuations.
5 This is
also true for West Germany: after the Deutsche Bundesbank had started to
announceannualtargetsforthemonetaryaggregate"Zentralbankgeldmenge"
(central bank money)6 in 1974, it missed the targets in about half the cases.
Furthermore, contrary to the intention, money growth was not more stable
than that in the years before 1974, cyclical fluctuations in the real economy
were nearly as pronounced as before, and until the early eighties, we experi-
enced inflation which was substantial by historical (post-World War 11)
standards.
7
Despite the criticism ofmanyadvisors inside andoutside West Germany,
theDeutscheBundesbankstillannouncestargetsformoneygrowth,although
in 1988, it changedthe targetvariable and nowuses M3. Thecase for dispens-
ing with the policy was notstrongatall: notonly didthe relationship between
money andeconomic activity continue to holdfairly weH, butthere were also
nochangesinthefinancialspherethatcouldhaveledtoas drasticmovements
in velocity as, for example, in the United States [Dudler, 1986].
Sincenosuchchangesareexpectedforthenearfuture, we holdthroughout
the paper that the case for a feedback-rule may not be as strong for West
Germanyas it is for the UnitedStates.8We want totest a "modifiedk-percent
rule" whichis similartothestrategytheDeutscheBundesbankhasintendedto
pursue ("potentialorientierte Geldpolitik"). When announcing the target for
thecomingyear,itevaluatesthedesiredrateofchangeforcentralbankmoney
according to three components:
5 Throughoutthispaperwe holdthatbusinesscycles arenotexclusivelycausedbyrealshocks.
Theempiricalobservationssuggestthatthesevenpost-warbusiness cycles inWestGermanywere
to a large extent induced by monetary policy. There was no inflationary boom without prior
stimulation,andnorecessionwithoutsubstantialrestrictionbythecentralbank. Onthis hypothe-
sis, see Scheide [1984; 1987] and Trapp [1976].
6 Thisaggregateis notidenticaltothemonetarybaseandcannotbepreciselycontrolledbythe
central bank. However, the relationship between both aggregates is fairly dose over time.
7 It seems that many ofthe factors mentioned by Barro and Gordon [1983] contributing to
permanent inflation also apply to West Germany: anticyclical behavior of monetary policy,
increase ofgovemmentdebt, andthe rise ofthe naturalrate ofunemployment. One may add,for
thisopeneconomy,therevaluationofthecurrencywhich,atthetimeitoccurred,obviouslyledthe
Bundesbank to increase the money supply faster in order to reduce pressures on the export
industry.
8 Ofcourse, it is correct not to rely on the absence ofsuch disturbances when devising a rule
[see McCallum, 1988, p. 176]. Thepurpose ofthispaper, however, is notto advocate a specific or
thepresumablybestrulebutrathertodemonstratethattheannouncedpolicywouldnothavebeen
bad at all ifit had been followed.Scheide: A K-Percent Rule 329
- the trend growth ofoutput ("potential" output);
- the trend growth ofvelocity;
- the unavoidable increase ofthe price level.
This procedure is equivalent to putting the relation ofthe quantity theory to
work, with theintentiontoreduceinflationas longas itis consideredtoohigh.
"Unavoidable rate of inflation" is somewhat vague. It can be interpreted as
being the rate that can be achieved without imposing a negative shock on the
economy through monetary policy; the Bundesbank intended to reduce the
inflation rate gradually [Deutsche Bundesbank, 1987, p. 96].
The purpose ofthis paper is to investigate how such a policy would have
worked if it had actually been pursued. In particular, we want to analyze
whethercyclicalfluctuations wouldhavebeensmaller. Inaddition, we assurne
that the Bundesbank aimed at zero inflation on average during the entire
period.9 The rule to be tested differs in two minor respects from the official
strategy: 10
(0 We use domesticdemand(GNPminus netexports)insteadofGNPas the
targetvariable,andthus also define velocityin termsofdomesticdemand.
The reason is that the link between money and domestic demand is
somewhatcloser,possiblydue totheinfluenceoftherelativelylargeexport
sector. 11
(iO While the Bundesban~ formulates the target growth for the monetary
aggregate for the change between the fourth quarter of year t and year
t + 1, we use annual averages.
Furthermore, we avoid the discussion of transition from positive to zero
inflation. For the sake of simplicity we assurne that, before the period of
simulation, the Bundesbank succeeded in achieving a stable price level. This
should in no way suggest that, in reality, a sudden transition to price level
stability would have been possible without a cost. 12
111. The Workings ofthe Rule
Targetingnominaldomesticdemandwiththeaimofkeepingthepricelevel
(in this case, the deflator ofdomestic demand) stable over the medium run,
9 From 1970 to 1987, the price level actually increased by 106 percent (GNP-deflator) or 95
percent(consumerprices),respectively, withsubstantialfluctuations intherateofchangefrom one
year to the next.
10 Wealsoconfineourselvestoannualdatain ordertogetas closetothestrategyfollowed by
the Bundesbank as possible.
11 Nothingis lost for the investigation because the cyclical fluctuations ofGNP are similarin
size and can largely be explained by changes in domestic demand [Scheide, 1987].
12 In principle, the procedure suggested here could be altered slightly: a policy conducive to a
gradual decline ofinflation, e.g., one percent per year, could be devised.330 Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv
amountstoa rule inwhichmoneygrowthis equaltothemedium-termgrowth
rate of output minus the medium-term growth of velocity. Actually, every
strategyformonetarypolicy- beitKeynesianormonetaristoranythingelse13
- needs anappropriateestimatefor bothtrendvariables. Thesimplest way to
analyzethebehaviorofa ruleinanex-postsimulationis toestimatethegrowth
rates outside the model. Forthe simulation, we holdthat the trendgrowth in
realoutputis invariantwithrespecttotheregimeofmonetarypolicy. Inreality
we could observe a downward trendofreal output; we assume, for simplicity,
thatthis decreasewas linear(whichis a roughapproximation),i.e., thegrowth
rateofdomesticdemanddeclinedsteadilyfrom 1970 onwards. Concerningthe
trendofvelocitywe assurnea constantrateofdeclinefromoneyeartothenext.
If we want to analyze how domestic demand is affected by changes in
money, we needa basicmodelforthis relationship. Inthispaper,we use - as a
starting point - a very simple form; the economy can be assumed to work
according to equation (1):
(1)
where
Yt == log ofnominal domestic demand,
mt == log ofcentral bank money,
Ut == error term with the standard characteristics.
Weconfineourselvestotheperiodinwhichthecentralbankwas able- because
offlexible exchangerates- andintended- becauseofa changetowarda more
monetarist philosophy - to control this monetary aggregate. Estimating this
equation for the period of 1972-1987, using annual data, we get14
- 0.0137 + 0.31946Yt-l + 0.75006mt
(0.0142) (0.1552) (0.1988)
0.64 S.E. == 0.0155 Durbin h == 0.33
(1 ')
There is a highly significant influence of money supply growth on nominal
income growth in the same period.15
In the first simulation exercise, the target growth ofcentral bank money
13 There is no dispute amoung the various schools that ifvelocity is "known" to fall perma-
nently by, say, ten percentin level, the moneysupply would have to be adjustedequivalently. The
difference lies"only" in thejudgementwhether such changes occurfrequently or"forno reason",
i.e., whether the demand for money is sufficiently stable over time.
14if is the adjusted correlation coefficient, S.E. is the standard error of the regression.
Accordingtothe Durbinhstatistic,thehypothesisofnoautocorrelationoftheresidualscannotbe
rejected. Standarderrors ofthe estimatedcoefficients are given inparentheses. Since theconstant
term is not significant one may argue that this equation should not be used for the simulation.
However, tests with an equation without the constant lead to practically the same result.(Llm*) is given by the rule:
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(2)
We assurne that trend inflation (LlPt) is zero. Furthermore, Xt and Vt are the






with LlXo == 0.030 and t == 0,1,2, ... ,15. 16
In the simulation
17 we use the values for money growth according to the
rule (2). Theeffects ofthatpolicy are estimated with (1 '). Theestimates ofthe
actual disturbances are fed in as they occurred.18 We get the value for the first
year(1972) bytakingthetrendvalueofthreepercentandaddingtheestimated
errortermfor this periode The effects ofthe hypothetical monetarypolicy are
now compared with the actual performance. The outcome ofthe simulation
reveals thatthegrowthofdomesticdemandis - as expected- notstable(Figure
1). However,thefluctuations arereducedcomparedtotheactualbehavior,the
variance is only one third of the variance of the growth in actual domestic
demand.Theroot-mean-squarederror(RMSE)is calculatedforthedeviations
ofthesimulatedseriesfromtrend. Itis now 1.39, whiletheRMSEfortheactual
series- i.e., thedeviationsofdomesticdemandfromits(inflationary)trend- is
1.90.
This may not look like a substantial improvement. However, ifwe take
some crucial cyclical episodes we may say that the recessions of 1974/75 and
1981/82wouldhave beenless pronounced.Tobesure,thedownturnscanstill
15 Several alternatives with respect to otherlag structures were tested. The equation reported
here is not only the simplest but also the best in terms ofstatistical criteria. - When estimated for
different periods, the coefficients ofthe equation change. However, they do so in such a way as to
leave theelasticitybetweenmoneygrowthandgrowthofdomesticdemandpracticallyunaffected.
This stability confirms the opinion of the Bundesbank that there is a fairly stable relationship
between central bank money and nominal income. See Deutsche Bundesbank [1987, p. 91].
16 This implies that llm* equals0.040 in 1972andthendeclines steadilyaccordingto(2a)and
(2b). This procedure assures that the value ofthe simulated nominal domestic demand in 1987 is
practically the same as the actual value ofreal domestic demand.
17 Following the reasoning in McCallum [1987], we hold here that we can use the reduced-
formequation(1 ')forsimulationinspiteofthepostulatedregime change,becausetherelationship
between nominal variables is not nearly as sensitive to the Lucas-critique as that between money
and real income.
18 Analternativewouldbetodrawtheseshocksrandomlyfromasampiedefinedbyazero mean
and variance ofthe shocks according to the estimated equation (1 ').332 Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv
be observed. But the change in the growth rate ofnominal demand in those
periodsis muchsmaller:forthefirst recession,thereductionofthegrowthrate
is onlyaboutonepercentagepointwhichcomparestomorethanfourpercent-
age points ofthe actual development. Forthe second recession, the respective
changes are less thanfive comparedto more than eightpercentage points. In
other words: since there would not have been inflationary expansions, there
wasnoneedfortheBundesbanktosteponthebrakesasitactuallydidduring
these periods. The downturns may be weH explained by other shocks, for
example,therecessioninothercountriesandtheadversesupplyshockscaused
by the increases in oil prices.
Figure 1 - Actualand Simulated Growth Ratesfor Domestic Demand
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In 1987, thereis a smalldeclineinthesimulatedvalueofnominaldomestic
demand. Itseemstooearlytojudgewhetherthis is duetoa substantialshiftin
the demand for money that could discredit this particular rule. To be sure,
nominal domesticdemandwould have beenlowerin 1987ifthe Bundesbank
had followed its own targets, i.e.,ifthe centralbankmoneyhad increased byScheide: A K-Percent Rule 333
some four instead of (the actual) six and eight percent in 1986 and 1987.
However,thatdoes notmeanthatwe wouldbeina recessionnow. Firstly,real
domestic demand actually increased at a higher rate than that what most
observers estimate to be the natural rate ofgrowth19, so a lower expansion of
monetary aggregates would have probablyprevented that. Andsecondly, the
deflator ofdomestic demand would be lower; after all, a rule like this implies
thatfavorable shocks - in this case, the decline in oil prices andin the value of
the dollar - will lead to a decline in the price level.
IV. Constant Money Growth
In the rule suggested above, monetary expansion slowly adjusts to the
decline ofoutput growth (modified k-percent rule). One might argue that the
central bank could not know the trend values postulated above. Therefore,
anotherversion ofthe k-percent rule was investigated which requires no such
"knowledge": How would the behavior of economic activity (domestic de-
mand) have changed if monetary growth had been kept constant at four
percentperyear?Usingthesamemodel(1 '),we getpracticallythesameresult
as before (Figure 1); the RMSE is 1.38. Butsince the average rate ofmonetary
expansionis higherthaninthepreviouscase,thereis a smallinflationarybias:
the average increase ofthe price level would have been some 0.5 percent per
year.20
V. Conclusions
For the simple model ofthe economy used in this paper, the simulations
suggest that monetary targeting is not useless. In fact, even t~ese extremely
simple andstrict rules canimprove the economicperformance by keeping the
price level stable in the medium runand reducing fluctuations which have, to
some extent, resulted from changes in monetaryexpansion. Whetherthe rules
tested are the best possible insurance against inflationary booms and severe
recessions or whether they can be improved will have to be investigated. For
thatpurpose,itis certainlyappropriatetoturntoquarterlydataanduse a more
detailed model.
Amongthe possible variations oftherules in this paper, one can think of
using a feedback-mechanism ifnominal income deviates from a target path;
19 Thisstrongincreasecameata timewhentheeconomywas- accordingtomostestimates-
already at its "full capacity".
20Thatis, given ourassumption that, onaverage, the real performance is not affected bythe
change in monetary policy. - Various alternatives were also tested. The results in terms of
variability- measuredbytheRMSE- arepracticallythesame; theyonlydifferwithrespecttothe
average inflation rate.334 Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv
thiswouldamounttoa - possiblyactivist- nominal-GNPrule(orinourcase:
nominal-domestic-demand rule). However, there are also limits: not every
reduction in the variability ofoutput is automatically increasing welfare. At
somepointthebenefitsofstablecreditconditionsmustbehigher. Ifwe follow
the underlyingpostulate oflong-run neutralityofmoneyandthe natural-rate
hypothesis,we mustsaythatthecentralbankshouldnotrespondtochangesin
realvariablesinthehopetoinfluencethemona permanentbasis. Accordingto
the assignment ofpolicies and instruments, monetary policy should concen-
trateonmaintainingpricelevelstabilityinthemediumrun,thetargetforwhich
it has a comparative advantage.21
The demonstration ofthe advantages ofthe mIes presented in this paper
rests on very simple assumptions which may be disputed. However, the
performance of the economy could even be improved by more than can be
shown in the simulations. These results would follow from the change in the
policyregime,andwe mayhavesomeideaastowhatsucha changecanimply.
Firstly,thepathofpermanentrealincomewouldhavebeenhigherifmonetary
policy hadbeenstable.22 We may not know much aboutthe costs ofinflation
andits variability,buttheremustbesomereasonwhyeconomistsrecommend
price level stability as animportant target for economic policy. Secondly, the
fluctuations that still exist due to other shocks would have possibly been
smallerifa similar,mle-likestrategyhadbeenfollowedbyfiscal policyinWest
Germany; this would have reduced shocks from fiscal measures. Thirdly, if
othercountrieshadalsofollowedsimilarmonetaryandfiscal policies, external
shocks via changes in exports or exchange rates would have been smaller.
Fourthly, if we assurne that oil prices or other raw material prices are not
completelyexogenous,fewer disturbancescouldhavealso beenexpectedfrom
thatside. All these considerations suggest that the Germaneconomycouldbe
better offtoday with stable - in the sense ofmle-oriented - policies.
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Zusammenfassung: Eine Regel rür ein konstantes Geldmengenwachstum in
der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. - Die Geldpolitik in der Bundesrepublik Deutsch-
land war in der Vergangenheit recht unstetig; sie hat konjunkturelle Schwankungen
mitverursachtundaußerdem zu einemfortwährenden Anstieg des Preisniveaus beige-
tragen. Mit einem einfachen Modell wirduntersucht, wie die wirtschaftliche Entwick-
lung verlaufen wäre, wenn sich die Deutsche Bundesbank seit 1974 an ihre Absicht
gehaltenhätte,die GeldmengeentsprechenddemWachstumdes Produktionspotentials
auszudehnen ("potentialorientierte Geldpolitik"). Die Simulationen zeigen, daß bei
strikter Einhaltung einer "k-percent rule" - ähnlich wie von Milton Friedman vorge-
schlagen - die konjunkturellen Ausschläge der Inlandsausgaben geringer ausgefallen
wären unddas Preisniveauim Durchschnittkonstantgebliebenwäre. Dieses Ergebnis
widerspricht der weitverbreiteten These, daß Geldmengenregeln nicht hilfreich seien.
*
Resurne: Une k-pourcent regle pour une politique monetaire en Allemagne de
l'Ouest. - Lapolitique monetaire dans la RFA etaitassez instable dans Ie passe; elle a
contribueauxfluctuations deIaconjonctureetaussi ciunemonteecontinuelleduniveau
de prix. L'auteur analyse ci l'aide d'un modele simple comment le developpement
economique s'aurait ete passe si le Deutsche Bundesbank aurait suivi son intention
depuis 1974 d'agrandirlamasse monetaire encorrespondance avec lacroissance dela
production potentielle (<<politique monetaire orientee au potentiei»). Les simulations
demontrentque sous lacondition d'unestricte observationd'une «regie k-pourcent»-
comme proposee par Milton Friedman - les fluctuations conjoncturelles des depen-
ses Iocales auraientetepluspetitesetIe niveaudeprixenmoyenneauraitresteconstant.
Ceresultatcontreditlathesetresrepanduequedes regles de massemonetairenesoient
pas utiles.
*
Resumen: Unaregla deI k porcien paraIa politica monetariaen Alemania Occiden-
tal. - LapoliticamonetariaenlaRepublicaFederaldeAlemaniafue bastanteinestable
en el pasado. Ella contribuyo a laaparicion defluctuaciones coyunturales y ademas a
unaumento deI nivel de precios. Conun modelo simple se estudia cuäl hubierasido la
trayectoria deI desarrollo economico encaso de que el Banco Central Alemanhubiera
continuado despues de 1974 con su intencion de expandir Ia cantidad de dinero de
acuerdo al crecimiento potencial deI producto (politica orientadahacia el crecimiento




regIas para Ia oferta de dinero no tienen efecto alguno.